When questioned on what led to the US capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and his wife, US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have homed in on two drivers: the country’s large oil reserves and the US’ desire to reassert its dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
Rubio focused on the latter: “We don’t need Venezuela’s oil. We have plenty of oil in the United States. What we are not going to allow is for the oil industry in Venezuela to be controlled by adversaries of the United States.”
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Neither of these drivers conflicts with the other, and might just be a reflection of the President and the Secretary of State having different target audiences.
“I don’t think that there’s real disagreement between the two about the […] fundamental security issues that they see at play here,” Michael McCarthy, founder and executive director of Caracas Wire, tells Investment Monitor. However, “Rubio has to present the White House’s ideas to Congress.”
Rubio’s comments regarding the presence of adversaries in the Western Hemisphere directly reference strategic goals set out in the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS), published in November 2025. The annual report is usually released without much fanfare. However, the most recent edition raised concerns given some of its radical stances – particularly when it came to Europe, where the document warned of the “prospect of civilizational erasure”.
The report focused on making foreign policy “America First”. According to a note from economic consultancy TSLombard, it “conjures a vision of stable multipolar equilibrium”. However, commitments to peace are caveated by the pursuit of a ‘peace through strength’ approach, where a strong military and pointed interventions, when deemed necessary, are encouraged.
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By GlobalDataIt also highlights that fighting against the accumulation of economic power – through investments in strategic locations, infrastructure, and critical goods and services – that has been obtained by adversaries (primarily China) in the Western Hemisphere is a renewed priority for the administration.
While there are plenty of drivers behind the US capture of Maduro, such as Venezuela’s oil reserves, the easing of migration into the US or the controversial 2024 Venezuelan election, (the outcome of which most independent observers considered fraudulent), viewed through the strategic goals set out in the NSS, the incursion into Venezuela is also about removing the influence of US adversaries from the Western Hemisphere.
The US’ desire to combat foreign influence in its own backyard is not new, but given the incursion into Venezuela, a new precedent has been set for how the administration pursues goals it deems necessary to national security within the Western Hemisphere.
The NSS wants to “deny” competitors strategic investments in the Western Hemisphere
The NSS explicitly says the Trump administration is reviving a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, through which it “will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere”. It alludes to China’s expanded presence in Latin America (“non-Hemispheric competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere”) and states that alliances must be built on the condition of decreasing the influence of outside actors (“the terms of our alliances and […] aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence – from control of military installations, ports and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets”).
“The Trump corollary of the Monroe doctrine is partly about business and profits, but it also has a strategic element,” Christopher Granville, managing director at TSLombard tells Investment Monitor. “It is also very much about spheres of influence. In this world of serious rivalry with a rising new peer superpower, the US has to ensure its sphere of influence.”
As part of an effort to regain lost influence in the Western Hemisphere and decrease that of China and other adversaries, the NSS says the US “will reform [its] own system to expedite approvals and licensing – again, to make [them]selves the partner of first choice”.
“We should make every effort to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region,” the document reads.
How economically involved were China and other US adversaries in Venezuela?
Venezuela has had long-standing ties with China and Russia since Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez, was in power. However, economic ties have significantly waned in the past decade, as both powers deal with more prescient problems – such as the war in Ukraine and China’s ensuing power struggle with the US.
China, for one, is still the biggest buyer of Venezuelan oil, but, according to data from China’s General Administration of Customs, bilateral trade peaked a year before Maduro got into power in 2013 (when it reached $23.8bn), and has been in decline ever since. Loans to Venezuelan entities also peaked in 2012 and have since diminished, Tang Xiaoyang, professor at Tsinghua University, tells Bloomberg, and while the Chinese Government has been quick to condemn the US’ actions, support has been mostly symbolic.
Russia has also provided economic and military help to Venezuela. However, reports suggest economic ties frayed after investments into Venezuela’s oil sector failed to be profitable for Russian energy companies.
A Reuters report from 2019 revealed that Venezuelan-owned company PDVSA owed hundreds of millions of dollars to Russian state-owned company Rosneft for their joint ventures. It notes that Russian companies doubled down on investments, despite evident problems and a lack of affordability from years before.
In May 2025, the countries signed a Strategic Partnership Treaty, calling for extended cooperation in energy, mining, transport, communications and counterterrorism. However, Russia has been under economic pressure since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following Maduro’s capture, the US seized a Russian oil tanker in the Atlantic carrying Venezuelan oil.
Venezuela also has strong ties with Iran and Cuba, both considered US adversaries. While it is known that the economic relationship with these powers is extensive, a lack of official records makes it difficult to calculate the exact nature of investments, debts and credit lines. Caracas stopped publishing this type of information following its sovereign default in 2017.
Latin American countries will be pressured to choose sides
While trade with Venezuela has been in decline, China’s economic ties in the rest of Latin America have been growing for decades. The biggest players in the region – Brazil and Mexico – along with tens of other countries, are members of the Belt and Road Initiative, an infrastructure programme that has seen China pour billions into projects worldwide, which it expanded to Latin America in 2018. These investments have become a sticking point with the Trump administration, which has accused China of rerouting exports through Mexico in order to circumvent tariffs.
Investments have not come without obstacles. In Brazil, the success of Chinese auto companies and the proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs) led the government to raise tariffs on auto imports and set local production laws. It ended up being a successful gamble for Brazil, as it led to major investments from Chinese companies.
BYD, for example, inaugurated its largest EV plant outside Asia in Brazil last October. The factory, which used to be a Ford site, represents an investment of $978m. However, now, the Trump administration could condition further tariff reprieves, for example, on a reduction of Chinese investment.
Last year, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s commitment to the continent during a forum with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, where he announced a new $9bn (62.79bn yuan) credit line and additional infrastructure investments. Even President Javier Milei of Argentina, whose government is a strong ally of Trump’s, has signed multiple trade agreements with China, which is still a major source of investment in various sectors.
For Latin American countries, Granville says there are two factors in the balance. On the one hand, “there is the absolute magnet of the US market”, but the economic rise of China has meant that there is now another major player to negotiate with. “The region does have economic partnerships with China. It is a big market for agricultural commodities and other exports, and a big inward investor,” Granville says.
“These economic ties are very deep, and they [could] offset the economic leverage which the US has in the region,” he adds.
Naturally, how individual countries in the region balance their relationships with these two powers will depend on their individual circumstances. Given Mexico’s border with the US and deep economic entanglements, for example, the country will likely have “more interest in maintaining its markets in the US” if it is a choice between that and foreign direct investment from China, Granville says.
In terms of how other Latin American countries should approach negotiations with the US in the future, and whether the incursion into Venezuela changes the landscape, Granville suggests that Trump’s typical playbook is still the most reliable.
“After the sound and fury dies down a bit and the dust settles, it will come down to bargaining, as we have seen with other parts of the world,” he notes.
